Valparaiso University

ValpoScholar
Law Faculty Publications

Law Faculty Presentations and Publications

2011

Precedent and Justice
William D. Bader
David R. Cleveland
Valparaiso University, david.cleveland@valpo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons

Recommended Citation
William D. Bader & David R. Cleveland, Precedent and Justice, 49 Duq. L. Rev. 35 (2011).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff
member at scholar@valpo.edu.

Precedent and Justice
William D. Bader* and David R. Cleveland**
Abstract

Precedent is the cornerstone of common law method. It is the
core mechanism by which the common law reaches just outcomes.
Through creation and application of precedent, common law seeks
to produce justice. The appellate courts' practice of issuing unpublished, non-precedential opinions has generated considerable
discussion about the value of precedent, but that debate has centered on pragmatic and formalistic values. This essay argues that
the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions does more than
offend constitutional dictates and present pragmatic problems to
the appellate system; abandoning precedent undermines justice
Issuance of the vast majority of decisions as nonitself.
precedential tears the justice-seeking mechanism of precedent
from the heart of our common law system.
In Memoriam Judge RichardS. Arnold (1936 2004)
"It is the property of a diamond ... to appear most brilliant in the
dark, and surely a good man never shines to greater advantage
than in the gloomy hour of adversity ."1
Sarah Livingston Jay
December 1779
.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Precedent is the cornerstone of common law method, the conceptual vehicle allowing law and justice to merge as one. Most proponents of precedent seem to miss the inherently justice-seeking
value of the concept, and, instead extol its pragmatic value. 2 We
contend much more: precedent is indeed where law meets justice.
In this essay, we will briefly examine the meaning of justice
from classical times to the present and illustrate why precedent is
justice-seeking compared to other adjudicative methods that have
been employed in legal history. Then, we will demonstrate how
failure to abide by precedent in a specific case, without distinguishing or overruling the precedent, is an injustice. Failure to
respect precedent systemically, as with the issuance of nonprecedential opinions, makes the law less just as a whole.

II.

THE MEANING OF JUSTICE AND PRECEDENT AS A JUSTICESEEKING MECHANISM

Our philosophy of justice can be traced directly from the classical Greek philosophers. 3 Although there was disagreement among
them regarding the substantive content of justice, most philosophers regard "equality'' (of some sort) as the framework of justice. 4
2. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (providing a fine
and legally important survey of the pragmatic rationale for adherence to precedent).
3. JOEL FEINBERG & JULES COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 389-90 (Wadsworth 2000).
4. Id.
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Aristotle is the most influential of the classical Greek thinkers
on the subject of justice. 5 He defines justice as proportionate
equality. The essential requirement of justice for Aristotle is that
like cases be treated alike or equally, in direct proportion to their
alikeness or equality.s
We certainly stand on the shoulders of the ancient Greeks and,
most particularly, Aristotelian shoulders. Amartya Sen, the Nobel
laureate and economist, recently wrote that, in theories of justice
from the Enlightenment to the post-Enlightenment, through the
present, equality is the common formal basis, regardless of substantive differences. 7 Sen explains:
[These theories of justice] demand equality of somethingsomething that is regarded as particularly important in that
theory. The theories can be entirely diverse (focusing on, say,
equal liberty or equal income or equal treatment of everyone's
rights or utilities), and they may be in combat with each other, but they still have the common characteristic of wanting
equality of something: (some feature of significance in therespective approach). a
The importance of precedent as inherently justice-seeking may
be seen in the differences between the precedent-based common
law compared to its immediate predecessors, such as trial by ordeal or trial by combat. While the latter methods are rooted in
mere chance or physical strength, the former is based on reason,
equality and fairness.
Trial by ordeal was prevalent in pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon Eng~
land. 9 For freemen, the most common ordeal was the hot iron.
Specifically, a hot iron bar was carried nine feet by the accused.
The accused's burns were bandaged for three nights and were
then uncovered. If the burns had healed, the accused was deemed
not guilty or not liable by the judgment of God. If the burns had
not substantially healed, the accused was deemed guilty or liable.10 It is indeed shocking how the legal method of ordeal is com-

5. ld.
6. See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J. L. Ackrill & J. 0. Urmson
eds., David Ross et al. trans., Oxford University Press 1998).
7. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 291-93 (2009).
8. ld. at 291.
9. THEODORE F. T. PLC
UCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 102 (The
Lawyers Co~Operative Publishing Co. 1929).
10. ld. at 102-03.
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pletely unrelated to justice and is no different in rationality than a
throw of the dice.
The Norman Conquest of England in 1066 brought with it the
trial by combat, which replaced the ordeal. 11 In civil cases, a battle was fought between "champions" who represented the par·
ties. 12 The champion was "originally a witness who was ... bound
by homage to defend his lord's title." 13 Later, champions formed a
professional group and were hired by litigants in a manner vaguely similar to lawyers. 14 In criminal cases, the litigants were required to personally fight each other to the death. 15 As with trial
by ordeal, trial by combat was a method completely unrelated to
rational justice. Although it was believed that God determined
the outcome of the combat, it was more accurately an institution of
"might makes right."
Within a century, however, Henry II began the process of uniting England under a common system of laws. 16 Soon, a more coherent system of law, involving both learned judges and professional bar, emerged. 17 The bench and bar, in the manner of all
bureaucracies, began to keep records of their actions and the arguments and decisions of courts then served as tools to guide arguments by advocates and judgments by the courts. 18 By 1250,
the common law system saw Henry de Bracton, an accomplished
judge, attempting to explain the principles and procedures of English law through a collection of cases and an accompanying treatise, demonstrating a strong belief in the value of precedents. 19
Even at this early stage, the core justice-seeking premise of the
common law was that, "if like matters arise let them be decided by
like, ... since the occasion is a good one for proceeding a similibus
ad similia."20 Soon after Bracton's effort, the arguments and decisions were being recorded in "the very words of judges and pleaders," and both counsel and the court cited to prior decisions and
11. Id. at 104.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. PLUCKNETT, supra note 9, at 105.
15. Id.
16. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 13-14 (4th ed. 2002)
("Against that uniform system, local custom would thereafter be seen at best as exceptional
and at worst as exceptionable."). Id. at 14.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id.
19. J. W. TuBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN
CONCEPTIONS 7-20 (2000).
20. ld. at 19
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knew full well that a decision would be viewed as precedent in lat·
er cases. 21 These records, while not individually binding in the
modern sense, were viewed as evidence that the course of the
common law was on the side of the advocate urging them . 2 2
In sixteenth century England, there was a dramatic transformation of legal methodology resulting in the modern common
23
law. Harold J. Berman writes of the period:
The new emphasis on the historicity of English law, that is,
on the normative character of its historical development over
generations and centuries, was manifested in new ways of
systematizing it. The most obvious methodological manifestation of the new historical jurisprudence was the emergence of
the modern doctrine of precedent.24
In this historical approach, guided almost entirely by precedent
or analogy to prior-similar cases, we see a critical connection between law and justice. Basic equality under the law, the essence
of justice, was instituted by treating like cases alike.
Sir Edward Coke was the most powerful judicial and scholarly
champion of this precedent-based common law. Coke writes
"Neminem opportet esse sapientiorem legibus: no man out of his
own private reason ought to be wiser than the law, which is the
perfection of reason." 25 Specifically, Coke defines law as an "artificial perfection of reason" that incorporates a judicial dialectic of
experience and legal precedent over time. 26 A judge is personally
constrained by precedent to applying the law in a just-equal way,
while continually refining the law by studying the precedents and
the facts of new cases. In Coke's work was seen a keen focus on
the nexus between the common law and justice via the utilization
of precedent.
Pioneering scholarship by William D. Bader27 and Henry P.
Monaghan, 28 respectively, and the great-seminal opinion of Judge
21. BAKER, supra note 16, at 225 (citing Midhope v. Prior of Kirkham, 36 S.S. 178
(1313) (Stanton, J.) (speaking of his decision, most likely directly to a reporter, "one may
safely put that in his book for law.").
22. BAKER, supra note 16, at 26.
23. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 270 (2003).
24. Id.
25. Coke, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Lib. 2. Cap. 6. Sect. 138 (3d. ed. 1633).
26. Id.
27. William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19
VT. L. REV. 5, 9 (1994).
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Richard S. Arnold in Anastasoff v. U.S. 29 demonstrate that the
common law respect for precedent inheres in the judicial power of
the. United States under Article III by means of the Framers' intent. Judicial respect for precedent is, therefore, a constitutional
imperative by virtue of original meaning.
There is a consensus that Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
was
the
singularly
most
important
.
intellectual influence on the attorneys who drafted the Constitution.30 In fact, Blackstone's Commentaries "rank second only to
the Bible as a literary and intellectual influence on the history of
American institutions."3 I
William D. Bader has previously concluded that Blackstone, in
the tradition of Coke, "regarded precedent as the ultimate cornerstone of the common law" and as a constraint on judges to justly
decide like cases alike rather than ruling according to their individual prejudices. 32 Blackstone writes on the justice-seeking function of precedent: "For it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; as
well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to
waver with every new judge's opinion."33 Blackstone concludes,
"the doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules
must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust." 34
One of the most important Framers, Alexander Hamilton, was
among the Blackstone-educated lawyers of the Founding. 35 Hamilton's intellectual preparation is manifest in his Federalist No. 78,
where he explains and defends Article III, the judicial article, of
the Constitution. 36 Bader has demonstrated that Hamilton "maintained that the common law method, and more specifically a
Blackstonian reverence for precedent, as the principal guarantee
of the rule of law, was inherent in Article III." 37 Thus, justice28. Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV.723,754(1988).
29. 223 F.3d 898, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2000).
30. See generally Bader, supra note 27, at 6-9.
31. Bader, supra note 27, at 8 (citing ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LE'ITERS IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 11 (1984)).
32. Bader, supra note 27, at 8-9 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS 69 (New ed., with the last corrections of the author
... ,with notes/by John Frederick Archbold, London, 1811)).
33. Bader, supra note 27, at 8 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at 69).
34. Bader, supra note 27, at 9 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra
note 32, at 70).
35. Bader, supra note 27, at 9 (citing JACOB COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 29 (1982).
36. Bader, supra note 27, at 9.
37. Id.

•
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seeking precedent, treating similar cases equally, is built into the
judicial function under the Constitution. In Hamilton's words:
"To avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensible that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case
that comes before them.''38
The earliest treatise of importance about the U.S. Constitution
was Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States.39 Bader has shown that Story believed, "the
common law method, as characterized by a Blackstonian-style
reverence for precedent, was rooted in Article 111."40
This essentially served justice by insuring that judges would
treat similar cases equally. In a pertinent passage from his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Story wrote:
Ours is emphatically a government of laws, and not of men;
and judicial decisions of the highest tribunal, by the known
course of the common law, are considered, as establishing the
true construction of the laws, which are brought into controversy before it. The case is not alone considered as decided
and settled; but the principles of the decision are held, as
precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is the constant practice under our whole system of
jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when
they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always has
been considered, as the great security of our rights, our liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law is
justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent principles,
and not dependent upon the caprice, or will of particular
judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated
by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself,
without reference to the settled course of antecedent principles.41

38. Bader, supra note 27 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Isaac Krammick ed. 1987)).
39. RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, Introduction to JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, XI-XII (photo.
Reprint 1987) (1833).
40. Bader, supra note 27, at 10.
4L Bader, supra note 27, at 10-11 (citing ROTUNOA, supra note 39, at 126~27).
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Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in his most important extra-judicial
scholarship, The Nature of the Judicial Process, provides a glimpse
into his understanding of precedent. Justice C.a rdozo wrote: "If a
group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the
same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles."42 Clearly, Justice Cardozo described,
in other words, the essence of precedent as treating similar cases
equally and therefore justly.
Justice William 0. Douglas, in a fascinating extra-judicial piece,
also attributed faithfulness to precedent as a matter of equality of
justice. He wrote "there will be no equal justice under law if a
negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon."43
s ·u rprisingly, Karl Llewellyn, hardly a legal formalist, sensed
that equal justice was the key to understanding the common law
concept of precedent. He wrote, most perceptively, that "[t]he
force of precedent in the law is heightened by ... that curious, almost universal, sense of justice which urges that all men are
properly to be treated alike in like circumstances."44
Most of the U.S. Supreme Court's more recent jurisprudence
supportive of precedent is best exemplified by Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 45 In Casey, exclusively
pragmatic issues are adduced to support adherence to precedent. 46
A rare exception to such pragmatically-driven cases is an opinion authored by Justice Souter and joined by Justice Stevens, in
which four additional justices concurred in judgment, James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia. 41 The Court in Beam held that a
prior Supreme Court civil ruling, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
which invalidated a Hawaiian distillery tax scheme, applies retro . .
actively to Beam's present claim at bar arising out of similar facts
48
antedating the prior ruling.
Justice Souter wrote that when the Supreme Court has applied
a rule of law to litigants in one civil case, it must apply the same
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1921) (quoting
W. G. MILLER, THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE 335 (1903)).
43. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949).
44. WILLIAM TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 232 (Robert

42.

Stevens et al. eds., University of Oklahoma ed., University of Oklahoma Press 1985) (citing
Karl N. Llewellyn, Case Law, 3 ENCYC. OF Soc. SCI. 249 (1931)).
45. 505 u.s. 833 (1992).
46. Id.
47. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
48. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 532-544.
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rule, now a precedent, to similarly situated civil litigants who subsequently appear before the Court, unless it is barred by procedural requirements or res judicata. 49 He rejected various pragmatic arguments for such adherence to precedent and announced,
instead, that "selective prospectivity . . . breaches the principle
that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a
fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law generally."50 Justice Souter went on to succinctly state his justice . .
seeking rationale in applying precedent, when he wrote that
"equality drives us."51

III. ABANDONING PRECEDENT UNDERMINES THE LAW'S ABILITY TO
RENDER JUSTICE

Despite the importance of precedent to justice, modern American courts frequently abandon precedent by issuing "unpublished
opinions."
These opinions are generally viewed as nonprecedential, though no principled basis for removing some decisions from the body of precedent has ever been enunciated. 52 If
the principle of precedent is intrinsic to the common law system of
justice, and we argue that it is, then it must be adhered to unless
some other principal is deemed to be overriding. Mere expediency
or efficiency is not sufficient. 53
The initial proposal for denying precedential value to some decisions failed to locate any principle of jurisprudence that would
justify the creation of unpublished opinions and non-precedential

49. Id. at 544.
50. Id. at 537.
51. Id. at 542. In an earlier case, Griffith v. Kentucky, Justice Blackmun had ruled
pragmatic considerations are trumped by the requirement of equal justice, with the latter
mandating that similarly situated criminal defendants be treated the same in questions
regarding the retroactivity of a new constitutional-criminal law precedent to pending or
non-final criminal cases~ 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
52. See David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning
Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61,70-84 (2009) (noting the
creators of the federal unpublication system's intentional refusal to consider the propriety
of their sub silentio denial of precedent to some opinions, viewing it as a "morass of jurisprudence."). See also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE,
COMM. ON USE OF APP. CT. ENERGIES, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS:
A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE ENERGIES OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON APPEIJ.ATE JUSTICE 20 (1973) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION].
53. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) ("although efficacious administra·
tion of governmental programs is not without some importance, 'the Constitution recogniz·
es higher values than speed and efficiency."'); citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656
(1972).
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precedents.
In fact, the whole idea of justifying such a fundamental departure from the common law's treatment of precedent
was dubbed a "morass of jurisprudence," and no further inquiry
was made into the propriety of courts removing their decisions
from the body of precedent. 55 Without any jurisprudential justification or even open examination, our federal judicial system has
abandoned the core mechanism of the common law in order to
manage the increased caseload. By creating and perpetuating a
system of non-precedential decision-making within our common
law courts, it has unwittingly and unreflectively weakened the
cornerstone of our system of justice.
Hopefully, upon long-overdue reflection, we will find a different
way to address the "crisis of volume" in the federal courts (and our
American courts generally), and end this system that runs counter
to human conceptions of justice, United States constitutional
guarantees, and the very notion of justice itself.
54

A.

Abandoning Precedent Is Contrary to Lay and Lawyer Conceptions of Justice

Failure to abide by precedent in a single case is an injustice, unless the court can distinguish the case or overrule the law. Failure
to abide by precedent systemically also makes the law less certain,
less reliable, and less just as a whole.
Humans have an inherent expectation that precedent will be
followed and that, when followed, it results in fair outcomes. 56
Failure to follow precedent results in a sense of unfairness and
injustice unless a reason for departure is given. 57 From young
children asking to be treated as older siblings were treated to the
expectation of equal work for equal pay, we perceive justice in
fairness and equality and injustice in different treatment without
justification. Indeed, decision-makers of all kinds fear "setting a
bad precedent" because they feel they will be expected to act the
same in the future, even though no formal mechanism exists for
enforcing precedent in that fashion. Precedent is fundamental to
even our lay perceptions of fairness and justice.58
54. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone, supra note 52, at 89-90; see also STANDARDS
FOR PuBLICATION, 20 (1973) (avoiding the issue of denying cases precedent as a "morass of
juris prudence").
55. STANDARDS OF PUBLICATION, supra note 52, at 20-21.
56. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987).
57. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1985).
58. Schauer, supra note 56.
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It is understandable then that adherence to precedent is critical
to our formal, government-run system of justice. 59 At its core, the
common law is about determining the applicable legal principles
and whether they apply to given facts by referencing past applications to similar facts. 6o Karl Llewellyn explained this well when
he wrote:
We have discovered that rules alone, mere forms of words, are
worthless. We have learned that the concrete instance, the
heaping of concrete instances, the present vital memory of a
multitude of concrete instances, is necessary in order to make
any general proposition, be it rule of law or any other, mean
anything at all.6I
1

In every case, the court applies the law to the litigants' facts and
doing justice in harmony with what has been done before and
providing another example for future parties to know what the
law is. This is the process of building and refining the common
law that Lord Coke viewed as the strength of the common law
form of meting out justice.62
The law is made up of applications of law, not just enunciations
of law, which is why we talk of the common law being "deprived"
of precedent6 3 and why Judge Arnold was troubled by the issuance
of unpublished opinions:
.

.

If we mark an opinion as unpublished, it is not precedent~ We
are free to disregard it without even saying so . . . . We are
perfectly free to depart from past opinions if they are un-

See, e.g., Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastosoff, Noncitation Rules,
and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002)
(examining the contemporary surveys of federal judges and lawyers). See also Lauren
Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion,, 87 MICH. L. REV 940 (1989).
59.

60. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH; ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-69 (1930).
61. Id. at 12.
62. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W.VA. L. REV.
43, 108 n.503 (2001); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original intent,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1537, n.91 (1987).
63. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Se_cret Law: What
Predicts Publication in the .U nited States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 73 (2001).
See also Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or

Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 785-801 (1995); Pamela Foa, A Snake in th.e Path of the
Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV~ 309, 338-41 (1977);
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the
United States Courts of Appeals:
The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHL L. REV. 573 (1981).
.
.
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published, and whether to publish them is entirely our own
choice. 64
This practice would not have sat well with the many common
law thinkers noted in Part I of this article, it does not sit well with
us, and it did not sit well with Judge Richard S. Arnold:
I would take the position that all decisions have precedential
significance. To be sure, there are many cases that look like
previous cases, and that are almost identical. In each instance, however, it is possible to think of conceivable reasons
why the previous case can be distinguished, and when a court
decides that it cannot be, it is necessarily holding that the
proffered distinctions lack merit under the law. This holding
itself is a conclusion of law with precedential significance ...
Every case has some precedential value, maybe not much, but
some. 65
The fundamental nature of precedent as inherent in our legal
system is apparent in the actions of both lawyers and judges, who
have continued to use unpublished opinions despite the practice
during the last three decades of limited publication, citation, and
precedent.
Lawyers and judges continue to find value in unpublished opinions and seem to reject the idea that these opinions lack value. 66
Surveys of judges and lawyers in the federal system demonstrate
that designating opinions unpublished has not prevented their
use.6 7 The White Commission Report, the result of a study of the
federal judiciary's structure undertaken in the late 1990s, revealed that federal judges and lawyers looked to and cited unpublished opinions with a frequency that suggested that they
found them to be of value. 68 More recent studies by the Federal
64. RichardS. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
219, 221 (1999).
65. Id. at 222-23 (emphasis in original removed).
66. Robel, The Practice of Precedent, supra note 59, at 401 ("[E]vidence suggests that
lawyers and judges value these opinions despite the rules limiting citation. This valuation,
in turn, suggests a cultural, rather than rule-based conception of stare decisis.").
67. Robel, The Practice of Precedent, supra note 59. See also Robel, The Myth of the
Disposable Opinion, supra note 59.
68. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. CTS. OF APPEALS,
WORKING PAPERS, at 3 (1998); COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED.
CTS. OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, at ix (1998). See also Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at
Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
199, 235, tbl. 6 (2001); Robel, The Practice of Precedent, supra note 59, at 405-07 (summa·
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Judicial Center ("FJC") and the Administrative Office ("AO'') support these findings. 69 Likewise, when the federal bench and bar
were invited to discuss the new rule permitting citation of unpublished opinions, these findings were further corroborated and
"often stated in emphatic terms." 7° For example, many lawyers
and judges reject the idea that a court can predict which cases will
have precedential value because "[o]nly when a case comes along
with arguably comparable facts does the precedential relevance of
an early decision-with-opinion arise ... Lacking omniscience, an
appellate panel cannot predict what may come before its court in
future days." 71 Recent studies by academics confirm the courts'
inability to determine ex ante which cases are of interest to later
litigants as precedent and which are not. 72 That is because no
such distinction exists. 73 Every decision a court makes is as precedential or non-precedential as a later court applying that decision
finds it to be based on the facts at bar. 74 It has been aptly noted
that, "[l]arge numbers of participants in the federal appellate system, including judges, use unpublished opinions in ways not contemplated by the publication, although completely consistent with
common-law understandings of practice surrounding precedent/' 75
rizing the relevant data from the White Commission's surveys of federal judges and law·yers).
69. TIM REGAN ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 10, 24-26, 39, 45-48
(2005); see also The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appea.ls, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 30, 65-66, 71 (2005); David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Lq,st Stone:
The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 61, 101-02.
70. Minutes of the 2004 Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules and Procedure, 8 (Apr.
13~ 14
2004)
available
at
http://www. uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/app0404. pdf.
71. Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions,
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 773 (2003).
72. Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog that Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, Judicial Conference Rulemaking, and Federal Public Defenders, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1491, 1550-51
(2005); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 63, at 120. See also Mark D. Hindberks & Steve A.
Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law:· A Proposal for the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 Washburn
L.J. 155 (1992) (collecting an overwhelming number of Kansas appellate cases in which
law-making opinions were designated as non-precedential).
73. The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly acknowledged the concept of
a non-precedential opinion. At most, it has acknowledged that the circuits believe unpublished opinions to be without precedential value. See C.I.R. v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7
(1987) ("The Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction regardless of nonpublication and
regardless of any assumed lack of precedential effect of a ruling that is unpublished.").
74. LLEWELLYN, supra note 60, at 52 (stating that it is the later precedent-applying
court that determines the scope of the earlier precedent-writing court's decision regardless
of the words earlier court).
75. Robel, The Practice of Precedent, supra note 59, at 414.
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The adoption of non-citation rules regarding unpublished opinions allowed circuits to strip these decisions' precedential value
sub silentio and without justification. 76 In fact, the committee
that proposed the non-citation rules considered declaring the decisions non-precedent outright but decided not to, fearing it a "morass of jurisprudence."77 The committee, therefore, decided to rely
on the principle of out of sight, out of mind, hoping that the "correspondence of publication and precedential value on one hand, and
of non-publication and non-precedential value on the other" would
reduce the precedential value of unpublished opinions without
anyone ever having to justify that result. 78
But some of the circuit judges charged with issuing these decisions perceived the threat to justice such a practice entails. Judges Holloway, Baldock, and Burnett of the Tenth Circuit expressed
their justice-focused concern in a dissent to the adoption of a nocitation rule:
The most important reasons for permitting citation of published precedents are just as cogent to me in the case of unpublished rulings. Each ruling, published or unpublished, involves the facts of a particular case and the application of lawto the case. Therefore all rulings of this court are precedents,
like it or not, and we cannot consign any of them to oblivion
by merely banning their citation. No matter how insignificant
a prior ruling might appear to us, any litigant who can point
to a prior decision of the court and demonstrate that he is entitled to prevail under it should be able to do so as a matter of
essential justice and fundamental fairness. To deny a litigant
this right may well have overtones of a constitutional infringement because of the arbitrariness, irrationality, and unequal treatment of the rule. 79
The dissenters questioned what they ought to do if they discovered a prior unpublished opinion whose ruling would be controlling if it were not technically unpublished and theoretically not
precedential. Principle and common law jurisprudence demands,
they determined, "[w]e would clearly have the duty as a matter of
76. STANDARDS FOR PuBLICATION, supra note 52, at 20-21.
77. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 52, at 20-21.
78. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 52, at 20-21.
79. Re: Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit. Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955
F.2d 36, 37 (lOth Cir. 1992) (Halloway, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
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basic justice to apply it, and in so doing logic would demand citing
the earlier ruling."so
Precedent's centrality to justice, or at least common law justice,
is apparent in the actions of lawyers and judges and their willingness to ignore and eventually remove rules contrary to precedent.,
The power of precedent within our legal system is too fundamental
and necessary to be set aside forever by rule. Three decades of
circuit rules creating non-precedential precedents have been unable to overcome the strong cultural and practical commitment to
the idea of precedent as inherent in every decision courts make. 81

B.

Abandoning Precedent Denies Justice-Seeking Constitutional
Guarantees

Precedent is the cornerstone of common law adjudication and is
the vehicle by which the common law system achieves justice.
Indeed, as Justice Story has noted, '~[a] more alarming doctrine
could not be promulgated by any American court than that it was
at liberty to disrega.r d all former rules and decisions and to decide
for itself, without reference to the settled course. of antecedent
principles.''82 Yet, a court iss.u ing an unpublished opinion essentially declares, "this law is good only for this one time and place;'
we need not follow or even acknowledge this decision in the future." That the federal courts issue over eighty percent of its opinions this way, suggests that Justice Story's fear has come to pass:
the American courts have abandoned precedent as a touchstone of
jurisprudence. 83 A court that can decide that its decision in the
present case need not be followed in the future and that prior decisions need not be followed because. of the manner in which they
were published has abandoned fidelity to precedent as a governing
concept.
To the individual party, abandonment of precedent creates an
unjust, perhaps unconstitutionally unjust, outcome. First, courts
are expected to exercise judicial authority over disputes to determine how the law applies to each case. This authority is limited
80. Re: Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals, 955 F.2d at 37 (Halloway, J.t dissenting).
81. Robel, Practice of Precedent, supra note 59, at 414.
82. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 34950 (1833) (1991).
83. One review of unpublished opinions found them replete with evidence that precedent is not being followed, resulting in unpublished opinions containing novel interpretations of the law, reversals of what the district court believed to be the law, split decisions,
decisions a,t variance with other panels of the same appellate courts, and, decisions that
evidence circuit splits. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 63.
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by precedent such that what has been done in the past is done
again, unless some rational basis for a departure is found. 84 Litigants expect their case to be decided in adherence to the court's
prior rulings and repeat-litigants expect that a ruling they receive
one day is the same ruling they would receive the next. The
court's unfettering itself from creating and following precedents
leads to blatantly unjust results for litigants involved. Take, for
example, the travails of Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART), a quasi-governmental agency that received qualified immunity in an
unpublished opinion of the Fifth Circuit, only to have that qualified immunity stripped away by a published opinion of the Fifth
Circuit two years later without any distinguishing of the facts of
the two cases, nor any dispute about the principle of law involved.85
Similarly, the court's failure to explain its departure from prior
law leads to unjust results. For example, in NLRB v. Family Fare,
Inc., 86 the Sixth Circuit issued an unpublished opinion that directly contradicted the published law of the circuit. 87 Both parties
were confused by the alteration of substantive law in an unpublished opinion. Both parties perceived that this opinion was
precedent for future decisions. Family Fare felt that it was treated differently than litigants in prior cases, noting, "[t]he Sixth Circuit has subjected the election here to a legal standard different
than the one that applies in every other comparable union election
case in the Sixth Circuit."88 Likewise, the NLRB also perceived
this as an alteration of the governing law, albeit a favorable one,
and to make sure that alteration would be made permanent, it
urged the Sixth Circuit to publish the opinion because it "'provides
84. Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F~3d 898, 902 (8th Cir.), vacated 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000) (noting that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them ....").
85. Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en bane); Anderson v. Dallas
Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 1998), affd, 180 F. 3d 265, (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1062 (1999).
86. N.L.R.B. v. Family Fare, Inc., 205 F. App'x 403 (6th Cir. 2006).
87. Petitioner Family Fare explained that the Sixth Circuit's published standard held
that "[t]he party challenging the election need not introduce proof of actual coercion," while
the Sixth Circuit panel's unpublished opinion in Family Fare, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. held, "[s]ome
showing of coercion is required to sustain a finding of objectionable condu.ct." See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Family Fare, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 551 U.S. 1133 (2007) (No. 06-1536),
2007 WL 1481871 at *4.
88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Family Fare, 551 U.S. 1133 (No. 06·1536) at *6.
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much-needed guidance on a new approach to what previously
[has] been an area of dispute between the Board and the Sixth
Circuit. '"89
If, as we have proposed, justice is primarily a matter of equality,
few constitutional protections embody that justice more than
Equal Protection. 90 The practice of abandoning precedent by issuing unpublished opinions has long been viewed as contrary to
Equal Protection. 91 The uncertain precedential status of the
court's unpublished opinions leads to situations that treat similarly situated litigants in a disparate manner. 92 As the Family Fare
and DART cases above starkly illustrate, similarly situated parties (or even the same party at different times) can come before
the court and receive diametrically opposed treatment. That is
unjust on a fundamental level. It is the opposite of how the common law should function.
Another constitutional protection aimed at promoting justice is
that of due process. Due process is the duty owed by government
to afford fair process before depriving someone of life, liberty, or
property. 93 This constitutional guarantee is fundamentally a duty
of government to follow a fair process of decision-making and to
both ensure fair play toward individuals and to minimize substantively unfair deprivations of life, liberty. or property. 94 Traditional
common law procedures have been considered the lodestar for determining fair process:
As this Court has stated from its first due process cases, traditional practice provides a touchstone for constitutional
analysis. Because the basic procedural protections of the
common law have been regarded as so fundamental, very few
89. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.L.R.B.'s Motion for Publication).
90. The requirement of treating similarly situated litigants in a similar manner is a
direct application of Aristotle's "proportionate equality." See generally ARISTOTLE, supra
note 6.
91. See, e.g., William J. Muller, Chipping Away at the Dam: Anastasoff v. United States

and the Future of Unpublished Decisions in the United States Court of Appeals and Beyond,
50 DRAKE L. REV. 181 (2001); Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff· The Procedural Due
Process Argument Rules Prohibiting Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695
{2001); Jon A. Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth
Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional,
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195 (2001).
92. Strongman, supra note 91, at 220.
93. Analisa Pratt, A Call for Uniformity in Appellate Courts' Rules Regarding Citation
of Unpublished Opinions, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 195, 214 (2005); Wade, supra note
91, at 717.
94. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972).
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cases have arisen in which a party has complained of their
denial. In fact, most of our due process decisions involve arguments that traditional procedures provide too little protection and that additional safeguards are necessary to ensure
compliance with the Constitution. Nevertheless, there are a
handful of cases in which a party has been deprived of liberty
or property without the safeguards of common-law procedure.
When the absent procedures would have provided protection
against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has
not hesitated to find the proceedings violative of due process.95
There are no traditional practices more fundamental to the
common law than the practice of precedent. What was adjudicated yesterday must be followed, distinguished, or the underlying
principle rejected, and failure to do so is an abandonment of the
common law system itself. Individuals order their affairs and
plan their behaviors to conform with existing law. They do so with
an expectation that the law as applied to them will be the same as
it has been applied to others. Failure to do so denies individuals
justice by denying the basic protections that: 1) past decisions can
be relied upon as law and 2) the court deciding the individual case
will do so in a manner that shapes the law going forward. It is
obvious why the public desires the first of these protections; they
have ordered their affairs in reliance and fairness requires equal
treatment.
But the second protection is also important.
Knowledge that the decision stands as possible precedent for future cases assures litigants that their case is not sui generis and
holds the court accountable. A common law court ought not be
able to issue a decision good only for a single time and place.
Abandoning precedent causes great harm to individual litigants
and individuals in society who might be litigants (which, given the
breadth of conduct governed by modern law, is all of us). But it
also causes dire systemic harms to our common law system of justice. It creates perverse incentives and allows for unjust practices
and outcomes.

95. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430-32 (1994) (holding that "Oregon
has removed that safeguard which the common law provided without providing any substitute procedure and without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any
way subsided over time") (internal citation omitted). See also Wade, supra note 91, at 717.
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Abandoning Precedent Causes Systemic Harm to our Justice
System

The ability of a deciding court to mark its opinions as precedential or non-precedential at the time of rendering the decision is an
abandonment of the notion of precedent and results in a less just
system overall. These systemic injustices fall into roughly five
categories of harms.
First, the ability to render decisions that are not precedential
encourages inappropriate strategic thinking among judges.H6
Judge RichardS. Arnold expressed this grave concern:
[I]f, after hearing argument; a judge in conference thinks that
[sic] a certain decision should be reached, but also believes
that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she
can achieve the result, assuming agreement by the other
members of th,e panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished
opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug.97
Judge Patricia M. Wald of the D.C. Circuit confirmed that such
"horse-trading'' behavior does take place:
[A] double track system allows for deviousness and abuse. I
have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished
decision incorp,o rating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid
a time.- consuming public debate about what law controls. I
have even seen wily would be dissenters go alon.g with a result they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent. We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues under the
rug.9s
The frequency of strategic thinking of this type, the type that
causes eases to be decided based on factors
not related to the case
.
at bar, is unknown. But at least one study has found such thinking on a broader scale. 99 A study of asylum cases in the Ninth Circuit has indicated that there is strategic decision-making about
publication among judges unrelated to the facts of the underlying
.

.

.

96. Arnold, supra note 64, at 223.
97. Arnold, supra note 64, at 223.
98. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results. of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995) (discussing her own observations as a judge
on the D.C. Circuit).
99. David S. Law, Strategic -J udicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 823 (2005) ("[t]he empirical literature on
publication is sparse.").
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case. 100 Other studies have indicated that many unpublished
opinions are lengthy, comple.x, or otherwise bear indicia of being
publication-worthy-yet something unrelated to the substance of
the case has caused them to go unpublished. 1o1 This inappropriate
use of strategic thinking about publieation. in making judicial decisions has long concerned Justice Stevens. 102 He recently ex ..
pressed his concern quite candidly, stating: "I tend to vote to grant
[certiorari] more on unpublished opinions, on the theory that occasionally judges will use the unpublished opinion as a device to
reach a decision that might be a little hard to justify." 103 There is
a significant and warranted concern that judges who seek a particular result not justified by current law· may be able to obtain
that result, co-opt would-be dissenters, or otherwise subvert the
normal judicial process simply by agreeing that any decision rendered would be unpublished and outside the body of preeedent. 104
This problem does not presuppose judges of ill-will or malice.
Even in the e,a rliest experimentation with limited publication and
precedent plans, important members of the federal judiciary real'

'

100. Id. at 820 ("[V]oting and publication are, for some judges, strategically intertwined:
for example, judg~s may be prepared to acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to their
own preferences, and to vote with the majority, as long as the decision remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent if the majority insists upon publication.")..
101. See e.g., ld. (collecting prior research); Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished
Opinions, 5 GREEN BAG 259, 260-63 (2002); Foa, supra note 63, at 315-40 (citing a sixmonth study of Seventh Circuit cases which revealed that fifteen percent of unpublished
cases were substantively significant and met the publication standards); Robert A. Mead,
(CUnpublished" Opinions as the Bulk of the Iceberg: Publication Patterns in. the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, 93 LAw LIBR. J. 589, 602·-oa (2001)
(examining publication rates by subject matter in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits over a sixmonth period and finding great disparity in publication rates, especially in areas where the
government is a litigant); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 63, at 120 (2001) (finding that
unpublished decisions have an effect on the- substance of the law and that unpublished
decisions are not simply routine application of the law but rather contain, "a noticeable
number of reversals, dissents, or ~oncurrences," and "significant associations between case
outcome and judicial characteristics''); Wald, supra note 98, at 1374 (noting a six-month
study of D.C. Circuit cases found forty percent of unpublished cases arguably met the publication standards and noting she believed that percentage to be much higher in 1995). See
also Hindberks & Leben, supra note 72 (collecting numer~us unpublished Kansas appellate
cases that are plainly law-making).
102. Justice John Paul Stevens, Remarks at the Illinois State Bar Association's Centennial Dinner; Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 22, 1977), quoted in Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Council of Lawyers, Browder v. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (No. 765325), 1977 WL 189280 at *37.
103. Jeffrey Cole & Elaine E. Bucko, A Life Well Lived.• An Interview with Justice John
Paul Stevens,. 32 NO. 3 LITIGATION 8, 67 (2006).
104. John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or
Invasive Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 123, 128 (2006) (warning of the substantial
incentive for judges to ''bury [their] departures from or narrowing of precedent" by rendering unpublished opinions).
•

Winter 2011

Precedent and Justice

55

ized the potential for harm to the system by careless or overuse of
the procedural shortcuts. Judge John R. Brown, then-Chief Judge
of the Fifth Circuit, sought to justify the court's adoption of a limited publication and precedent rule, but in so doing he warned
that its use should be sparing and careful:
[T[he Court, by the adoption of the [precedent-limiting] Rule,
affirms that it must be carefully and selectively employed ...
. The Court recognizes that it must the word is must never
apply the Rule to avoid making a difficult or troublesome decision or to conceal divisive or disturbing issues. This means
that while Rule 21 should make a real contribution toward
the goal of avoiding delays which can often amount to a denial
of justice, it must be sparingly used . . . . The Court itself
must be vigilant. We believe we are sensitive now to the factors which would make application of the Rule wrong or unwise or inappropriate. It is the Court's purpose to heed them
and in our own survival assure survival of the system we
cherish. 105
Judge Brown's fears have come to pass. 106 A system that both
permits and structurally encourages such strategic decisionmaking based on factors not relevant to the case at bar has lost its
justice-seeking focus.
Second, failure to regard each decision as precedent allows for
unwitting departures from, or needless delay in establishing, settled law. The departures result in a failure to treat similarly situated parties similarly- a denial of basic equality. In U.S. v. Rivera-Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with no less than
twenty unpublished circuit opinions blatantly divided on a single,
simple issue . 107 Yet because none of the unpublished decisions
were viewed as precedent, each could be ignored in favor of what-

105. N.L.R.B. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am., AFL-CIO Local 990, 430 F.2d
966, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1970).
106. See David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the Jurisprudentially Unsound Unpublication System, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (2009) (claiming the current
use of unpublished opinions is neither sparing nor carefully limited); see also, Jeffrey Cole
& Elaine E. Bucklo, supra note 103 (quoting Justice Stevens as saying, "Well, I tend to vote
to grant more on unpublished opinions, on the theory that occasionally judges will use the
unpublished opinion as a device to reach a decision that might be a little hard to justify.").
107. 222 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000). Of the twenty decisions identified in RiveraSanchez, eleven decisions ruled in favor of one procedure, six in favor of another, and three
remanded to force the district courts to take a position on the proper process. RiveraSanchez, 1057 U.S. at 1063.
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ever the ruling panel assigned to that case found appropriate. 108
Failure to recognize the inherent precedential value of these decisions allowed these litigants to be treated differently, prevented a
single law of the circuit to emerge, and caused confusion among
lawyers and litigants about what to expect from the court on this
issue. Similarly, in Family Fare, Inc. v. NLRB, the Sixth Circuit
so blatantly departed from the published standard regarding an
issue of law that both parties acknowledged the departure from
precedent. 109 Yet, the court issued its decision as unpublished,
apparently willing to allow its new rule to govern the instant case
but not to govern cases in the future. 110 This type of unequal
treatment of litigants resulting from as systematic disregard for
precedent is not a new occurrence. Its deleterious effects were
noted in a series of criminal appeals in the early years of the nonprecedential unpublished opinion experiment~ 111 A series of crim·
inal appeals found considerable inconsistency over both the legal
standard ("founded suspicion" or "probable cause") and the standard of review ("de novo'' or "abuse of discretion") to be applied. 112
This inconsistency between panels and between published and
unpublished opinions undermine the critical goal of "uniform . . .
application of the law." 11 3
Third, failure to see the precedential value of each of the federal
courts' decisions allows for splits in the law, yielding different outcomes depending on the circuit in which the action is brought. If
equality or fairness are touchstones of justice, such splits are fundamentally unjust. Though the Court denied certiorari in Smith
v. United States, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter
warned, "[n]onpublication must not be a convenient means to prevent review. An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect
in the Circuit and surely is as important to the parties concerned

108. This muddle was exacerbated by the then-current local rule that forbade counsel
from even mentioning unpublished decisions. 9th Cir. R. 36-3. Following the passage of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, counsel are at least permitted to tell the eourt
that its panels are deviating from one another, though nothing compels the panels to stop
doing it because no precedential value needs to be accorded to any of these decisions. See
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
109. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Family Fare, 551 U.S. 1133 (No. 06-1536) at *4-

7.
110. Family Fare, Inc., 205 F. App'x 403.
111. James N. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?,
61 A.B.A. J. 1224, 1225-26 (1975).
112. Gardner, supra note 111, at 1225-26.
113. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPML 38 (1976).
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as is a published opinion." 114 Similarly, in St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Emp., two Justices noted this threat to
uniformity and dissented from denial of certiorari because Fifth
Circuit unpublished decision created a split between the circuits
on an "important question of federal law" that "could easily result
in the same collective-bargaining contract, or identical ones, being
interpreted in different ways in different circuits." 115 To treat
some decisions as precedent and others not, interferes with the
•
proper review process.
Fourth, justice is undermined when precedent is abandoned in
unpublished opinions because such wrongful decisions are shielded from proper higher court review, which allows uncertainties or
discrepancies in the substantive law to linger. An unpublished
opinion is supposed to signal that a case is a routine, noncontroversial application of settled law, but that is not always the
case. 116 A decision rendered by unpublished opinion has also likely received less judicial attention and has a less well-developed
record and opinion, which also discourages Supreme Court review.
In cases like United States v. Edge Broad. Co., and County of Los
Angeles v. Kling, Justices of the Supreme Court have expressed
surprise and dismay at the circuit courts' practice of deciding issues of first impression or other close cases by unpublished opinion.117 Justice Marshall, in County of Los Angeles v. Kling, called
the practice "plainly wrong'' and noted that such summary process
is done "without the discipline and accountability that the preparation of opinions requires."llB

114. 502 U.S. 1017, 1019-20, n.* (1991) (Mem). See also Waller v. United States, 504
U.S. 962; 964-65 (1992) (White, J. and O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Mem). See also Hyman v.
Rickman, 446 U.S. 989, 990-92 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Mem) (dissenting from
denial of certiorari on the grounds that the unpublished circuit opinion was in conflict with
other circuits on the issue of right to appointed counsel).
115. 484 U.S. 907 (1987) (Mem.) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 63, at 120.
117. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3 (1993) ("We deem it remarkable and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act
of Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its
judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion."); County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S.
936, 937-39 (1985) (Marshall J., dissenting) (''The brevity of analysis in the Court of Appeals' unpublished, noncitable opinion, however; does not justify the Court's summary
reversal ... For, like a court of appeals that issues an opinion that may not be printed or
cited, this Court then engages in decision-making without the discipline and accountability
that the preparation of opinions requires.").
118. Kling, 474 U.S. at 937-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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Fifth, abandoning precedent, even for practical reasons, undermines the people's faith in judges and the judicial system. This
harkens back to the issue of public perceptions of precedent as
critical to equality, fairness, and justice. The judiciary is increasingly viewed as powerful and unaccountable.,119 and calls for judicial oversight, impeachment, and transparency seem to be on the
rise. One reason for this, we propose, is that the judiciary (or at
least that portion in favor of precedent-free opinions) has viewed
precedent as a tool for consciously shaping the law rather than an
inherent part of how the law functions. 12° For an appellate court
to make law that governs only that single instance and that they
intend no one to rely upon in the future is contrary to the public's
sense of justice. This perception is important for both public trust
as well as to serve as example for, and backstop to, the actions of
other government entities:
Appellate justice should be a model for the government's dealings with citizens. Appellate courts are the most dignified
and receptive authorities to which individuals can turn" .. If
these courts do not deal justly with litigants, we cannot expect
agencies or bureaucracies of lesser sensitivity to legal rights
to do so. It is therefore important that justice on appeal be
visible to all. 121
If we believe that our courts are guardians of fairness and protection against all others (individuals, organizations, and even the
other two branches of government), then they must operate in a
principled fashion and not in a manner that can yield different
outcomes for what appear to be idiosyncratic reasons or no reason
at all.
By denying the precedential value of so many court decisions,
we are making our legal system less effective, less consonant with
public perception of justice, and, ultimately, less just. Loosing our
119. See, e.g., Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of
and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 901 (2007) (two national
surveys indicate that nearly one third of Americans polled believe the Supreme Court "has
too much power."); Lance Eric Neff, Keys to the Kingdom: Interpretive Power and Societal
Influence During Two Ages, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 697, 701, n.19 (noting that the judiciary is commonly perceived as being "too powerful" and relatively unaccountable).
120. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating the role of the
courts is to develop a coherent law and finding in the federal circuit courts the power and
authority to achieve discretionary review akin to the Supreme Court's discretionary review).
121. CARRINGTON, supra note 113, at v.
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courts from the dictates of precedent and rewriting precedent as a
concept to be bestowed on opinions whose outcomes the court approves of has eroded our ability to create a just process or reach
just outcomes. It harms individuals but it also harms the public
and the legal system as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION

We firmly believe that precedent is the cornerstone of justice
and that abandonment of precedent threatens to undermine both
the perception and reality of justice in our legal system. Judge
Richard S. Arnold expressed this belief with extraordinary courage and eloquence:
It is often said among judges that the volume of appeals is so
high that it is simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential value
to every decision. We do not have time to do a decent enough
job, the argument runs, when put in plain language, to justify
treating every opinion as a precedent. If this is true, the judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the remedy is not
to create an underground body of law good for one place and
time only. The remedy, instead, is to create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that is not practical, for each
judge to take enough time to do a competent job with each
case. If this means that backlogs will grow, the price must
still be paid. 122
We agree. It is said that hard cases, if we allow them to, make
bad law. 123 We have allowed for too long the hard case of volume
122. Anastasoff u. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated 235 F.3d
1054 (2000) (en bane). See also Re Rules of U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit, 955
F.2d at 38 (Halloway, J., dissenting):
It may be suggested that in the rush of our business, we must prepare orders and
judgments which are not written in the form of polished discourses which we wish to
serve a$ citable opinions. This is the most untenable of the notions suggested for the
no-citation rule. In light of our caseload, we are obviously driven to entering orders
which are not the literary models that we would like to produce as opinions. Nevertheless, the basic purpose for stating reasons within an opinion or order should never
be forgotten that the decision must be able to withstand the scrutiny of analysis,
against the record evidence, as to its soundness under the Constitution and the statutory and decisional law we must follow, and as to its consistency with our precedents. Our orders and judgments, like our published opinions, should never be
shielded fro_m searching examination.

Id.
123. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109 (1842) (''This is one of those unfortunate
cases in which ... it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but
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pressures on the judiciary to make bad law in the form of nonprecedential decision-making. The idea that a common law court
can issue a non-precedential decision has never been justified jurisprudentially, creates significant harms to litigants and the legal
system, and tears the justice-seeking mechanism of precedent
from the heart of the common law endeavor. The bench and bar
should reaffirm our commitment to justice and our willingness to
accord precedential value to every decision of our courts.

by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has frequently been
observed, are apt to introduce bad law.").

